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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission in wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
consisting of one multiple-antenna base station (BS), multiple single-antenna legitimate users,
one single-antenna eavesdropper and one multiple-antenna cooperative jammer. In an effort to reduce
the scheduling complexity and extend the battery lifetime of the sensor nodes, the switch-and-stay
combining (SSC) scheduling scheme is exploited over the sensor nodes. Meanwhile, transmit antenna
selection (TAS) is employed at the BS and cooperative jamming (CJ) is adopted at the jammer
node, aiming at achieving a satisfactory secrecy performance. Moreover, depending on whether
the jammer node has the global channel state information (CSI) of both the legitimate channel and
the eavesdropper’s channel, it explores a zero-forcing beamforming (ZFB) scheme or a null-space
artificial noise (NAN) scheme to confound the eavesdropper while avoiding the interference to the
legitimate user. Building on this, we propose two novel hybrid secure transmission schemes, termed
TAS-SSC-ZFB and TAS-SSC-NAN, for WSNs. We then derive the exact closed-form expressions for
the secrecy outage probability and the effective secrecy throughput of both schemes to characterize
the secrecy performance. Using these closed-form expressions, we further determine the optimal
switching threshold and obtain the optimal power allocation factor between the BS and jammer
node for both schemes to minimize the secrecy outage probability, while the optimal secrecy rate
is decided to maximize the effective secrecy throughput for both schemes. Numerical results are
provided to verify the theoretical analysis and illustrate the impact of key system parameters on the
secrecy performance.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks; physical layer security; multiuser scheduling; transmit antenna
selection; cooperative jamming; secrecy outage probability; effective secrecy throughput
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are envisioned as an emerging research field with numerous
applications, such as health monitoring, vehicular tracking, military surveillance and environment
sensing. Therefore, the research of WSNs has recently attracted a tremendous amount of attention
from both industry and academia [1,2]. Generally, in the WSNs, a large number of the sensor nodes
are deployed to collect the environmental information, and then report the sensed data to a base
station (BS) wirelessly [3,4]. However, the secure transmission of WSNs is a fundamental concern due
to the broadcast characteristics of radio propagation, and thus the sensing information is required
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to be safeguarded [5,6]. Conventionally, the cryptographic encryption relying on a secrecy key is
broadly adopted to protect the confidential message from being wiretapped by the eavesdroppers.
Nevertheless, the limitations behind the traditional cryptographic techniques lie in the complex
protocols and architectures for the distribution and management of secret keys. It is noteworthy that
the sensor nodes are the energy-constrained, cost-constrained, and lightweight computing devices,
in which a considerable portion of the available energy is allocated to support the core sensorial
and computational capabilities. Hence, there is possibly little left over to provide the security [7–12].
As such, it is of interest to explore efficient and low-complexity protocols to guarantee the secrecy
of WSNs.
To address the above concerns, the physical layer security (PLS) technique has emerged as an
attractive approach to achieve the perfect secrecy from an information-theoretical perspective [13].
The basic idea of PLS is to take advantage of the imperfection of wireless medium (e.g., fading,
interference and noise) to ensure the secure transmission between the legitimate parties. By introducing
randomness and structured redundancy into the data signal, the PLS enables legitimate users to
decode the confidential messages correctly while keeps the eavesdropper from extracting the messages
successfully [4,14,15].
Recently, various advanced techniques such as multi-antenna, cooperative relaying and
cooperative jamming have been incorporated to further boost the potential benefits of PLS. In particular,
transmit antenna selection (TAS) has been widely investigated on account of the low realization
complexity of radio frequency (RF) chain, meanwhile yielding full diversity [16–21]. Recently,
Yang et al. [16] proposed and analyzed TAS to enhance PLS in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wiretap channels. Later on, TAS with Alamouti coding and power allocation was addressed in [17].
Considering the outdated channel state information (CSI) due to feedback delay, the authors in [18]
investigated the secrecy outage performance of spectrum sharing MIMO networks with generalized
TAS and maximal ratio combining (MRC) over the Nakagami-m channel. Based on whether the source
node has the global CSIs of both the main link and eavesdropper’s link, optimal antenna selection
(OAS) and suboptimal antenna selection (SAS) were proposed in [19] with the traditional space-time
transmission (STT) as a benchmark in MIMO systems. Meanwhile, [20] examined TAS/MRC and
TAS/selection combining (SC) scheme with decode-and-forward (DF) relaying in underlay spectrum
sharing with multiple primary users (PU) transceivers and multiple antennas at the secondary
users (SUs). In addition, in [21], the secrecy performance of multiple-input single-output (MISO)
simultaneous wireless information and the power transfer (SWIPT) system was studied with TAS and
imperfect CSI.
In parallel, cooperative jamming has been identified as an effective paradigm to enhance
the security due to its ability of reducing the leakage rate to the wiretapper. Loosely speaking,
the jamming signals can be transmitted from the source [14,15], the legitimate destination [22,23] and
the relay [24–30]. As indicated in these studies, the jamming signals need to be designed carefully
since the interference may also be leaked to the desired user. With the assistance of artificial noise,
the optimal secure transmission was addressed by considering an on-off transmission scheme and an
adaptive transmission scheme in the MISO single-antenna eavesdropper wiretap channel [14] and in the
MISO multi-antenna eavesdropper wiretap channel [15], respectively. In [14,15], the artificial noise was
transmitted in conjunction with the information signal at the BS, and beamforming matrix was designed
to deteriorate the eavesdropper’s channel quality by transmitting noise in all directions except towards
the intended user. Furthermore, [22] generated the artificial jamming noise at the legitimate receiver,
under the assumption that the receiver knows the artificial jamming noise and thus can cancel it by
performing self-interference subtraction. In [23], a joint scheme of destination-aid cooperative jamming
and precoding at both the source and the relay was proposed for dual-hop amplify-and-forward MIMO
untrusted relay systems, where the self-interference is assumed to be perfectly estimated and can be
subtracted from the received signal. In addition, considering the jamming signals emitted by the relay,
the external helper degraded the eavesdropper’s channel without hurting the legitimate channel. With
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imperfect CSI, the secure communication aided by a multi-antenna cooperative jammer was addressed
in [24]. Taking into account which role the helper should take to enhance the secrecy, [25] investigated
a direct transmission scheme (DTS) and a relay transmission scheme (RTS) in terms of ergodic secrecy
rate and optimal power allocation. The work in [26] investigated different secrecy rate optimization
techniques for a multi-antenna cooperative jammer assisted MIMO secrecy channel. Moreover, in [27],
three secure transmission schemes were investigated in multi-antenna relay systems with cooperative
jamming in terms of the ergodic achievable secrecy rate. Very recently, the worst-case cooperative
jamming for secure communications in the cognitive internet of things (CIoT) was investigated in [28].
In [29], the MRC/ZFB scheme at the relay was designed to enhance the secrecy performance of
dual-hop multi-antenna spectrum sharing relaying networks, while the cooperative jamming with the
ZFB scheme was addressed in [30] to achieve secure transmission in cooperative relaying networks.
It is critical to note that, in multiuser communication systems, the conventional opportunistic
scheduling scheme requires the feedback of channel information for all the diversity branches. Based on
the continuously-updated CSIs of all the nodes in the network, full multiuser diversity gains are
explored at the central scheduler. However, a significant portion of the battery energy of the low-end
terminals and a large share of air-link resources are occupied to feed the CSIs back instead of valuable
data traffic [31]. To circumvent this difficulty, the multiuser switched diversity scheduling schemes
were proposed in [32] in order to search any acceptable user (i.e., with good channel quality) rather
than the best one among all. Recently, PLS with threshold-based multiuser scheduling was studied in
multi-antenna wireless networks [33]. Considering the imperfect decoding at the regenerative relay,
the secure multiuser scheduling was investigated in dual-hop relay networks over Nakagami-m fading
in [34]. In particular, the multi-branch switch-and-stay combining (SSC) scheme was first addressed
in [35], which reduces the implementation complexity for multi-channel communication scenarios.
In the multi-branch SSC scheme, if the channel quality of the currently connected branch exceeds a
predetermined threshold, then this branch is kept. Otherwise, no matter what the channel quality
of the switch-to branch is, the scheduler settles on that branch for the next transmission burst [35].
It is noteworthy that, in considering the opportunistic relay selection in cooperative networks, the
distributed SSC scheme was explored in [36] for secrecy enhancement. More recently, a secure SSC
protocol was proposed in [37] to overcome the high relay switching rate for two-phase underlay
cognitive relay networks.
To the best knowledge of the authors, the SSC based secure multiuser transmission with TAS and
cooperative jamming for WSNs has not been reported in literature thus far. We are therefore motivated
to examine the security level of such networks when cooperative jamming is applied in parallel with
user selection. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Two novel hybrid secure transmission schemes, i.e., TAS-SSC-ZFB and TAS-SSC-NAN, are
proposed for securing the data transmission in WSNs while achieving low feedback requirements
and examination costs.
• Exact closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput
are derived for the proposed schemes, which provide an efficient and convenient approach to
characterize the secrecy performance of the considered network.
• Using these closed-form expressions, the optimal switching threshold is determined and the
optimal power allocation factor between the BS and CJ is obtained for both schemes to minimize
the secrecy outage probability. In addition, the optimal secrecy rate is decided for both schemes
to maximize the effective secrecy throughput. Our findings demonstrate that the TAS-SSC-ZFB
scheme outperforms the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme in terms of both secrecy outage probability
and effective secrecy throughput, while the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme is more robust than the
TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. In Section 2, the system model and
transmission protocols of TAS-SSC-ZFB and TAS-SSC-NAN are presented, and the secrecy performance
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of both schemes are analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, the numerical simulation and discussions are
provided to validate the theoretical analysis. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. System Model and Transmission Protocol
2.1. System Model
Let us consider a multiuser downlink wireless sensor network, as illustrated in Figure 1, in which
a base station (A) with AA transmit antennas serves NB single-antenna legitimate sensor nodes (B) in
the presence of a single-antenna eavesdropper (E), and a friendly pure jammer (J) with AJ antennas(
AJ ≥ 2
)
. In this model, we preserve the practical assumption that the legitimate channel, jammer’s
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel are subject to independent and non-identically distributed
(i.n.i.d) flat Rayleigh fading such that they have different average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), i.e.,
γB, γJ and γE, and the involved fading coefficients are quasi-stationary within the channel coherence
time. In order to perform secure transmission, the BS encodes the messages with a capacity achieving
wiretap codebook and then transmits the resulting codewords to the legitimate user. In addition, each
transmission block is considered to be equivalent to the channel coherence time and is composed of
two parts, i.e., guard time and data transmission time.
Eavesdropper
Base station
(A)
(E)
1
2
BN
Cooperative jammer
(J)
Legitimate nodes (B)
Figure 1. System model.
2.2. Secure Transmission Schemes
We now detail the proposed secure transmission schemes in the considered WSNs. In general,
the complete transmission procedure can be separated into two phases.
In the first phase, an acceptable user of NB candidates is selected according to the SSC scheme [35]
out of AA transmit antennas within the guard time to carry out the data transmission. To be
specific, considering the first transmit antenna (α=1), the previously selected user k (k ∈ {1, 2, ..., NB})
compares its instantaneous SNR γbα,k with the pre-determined switching threshold γT. If the received
instantaneous SNR exceeds γT, then it stays without switching over and feeds the SNR and user index
back to the BS with γB,α=γ
b
α,k ≥ γT. Otherwise, it switches to the next user regardless of its SNR
following the similar feedback operation with γB,α=γ
b
α,k+1. The same SSC operation repeats for the
rest of AA − 1 transmit antennas.
To proceed, the pair of transmit antenna and corresponding selected user that gives the largest
instantaneous SNR is picked out, which is right for the data transmission time. As such, only one
legitimate user is scheduled for data transmission without continuously examining all the users in
the WSNs, which brings about considerable savings of feedback requirements and implementation
complexity. Therefore, the selected antenna is given by
α∗ = argmax
1≤α≤AA
(
γB,α
)
. (1)
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In the second phase, we consider a cooperative relay node, which serves as the friendly pure
jammer. Note that the synchronization requirement between the cooperative jammer and the BS can be
implemented by some well-known techniques, for instance, the time-service from the GPS or compass.
Alternatively, the BS can broadcast the timing information, which enables the cooperative jammer to
keep the same pace with the BS. Depending on whether the relay node has the global CSIs of both
J → B link and J → E link, the ZFB scheme and NAN scheme are, respectively, explored to confound
the eavesdropper while avoiding interference with the selected legitimate user.
2.2.1. Zero-Forcing Beamforming
Firstly, similar to [29,30,38,39], we assume that the CSIs of both J → B link and J → E link are
available at the relay. It is pointed out that this scenario is reasonable in the multiuser system where the
user may play dual roles as legal receiver for some messages and as eavesdropper for others [40–42].
The purpose of the ZFB scheme is to maximize the interference imposed on the eavesdropper
while avoiding the interruption to the selected legitimate user. To this end, according to the principle
of ZFB scheme, we obtain
max
w
∣∣∣h†JEw∣∣∣ ,
s.t.
∣∣∣h†JBw∣∣∣ = 0 & ‖w‖F = 1, (2)
where † denotes the conjugate transpose operator and ‖·‖F represents the Frobenius norm. w is the
weight vector, hJB and hJE, separately, denote the AJ × 1 vector for the CSIs of J → B link and J → E link,
whose entries follow Rayleigh distribution with zero mean, and variance λJB and λJE, respectively.
Based on the projection matrix theory [43] (Proposition 1), the optimum beamforming vector w is
given by
w =
ℵ⊥hJE∥∥ℵ⊥hJE∥∥F , (3)
where ℵ⊥ = I − hJB
(
h†JBhJB
)−1
h†JB is the projection idempotent matrix. Hence, the instantaneous SNR
of the legitimate channel is given by
γB=
PA
σ2B
|hα∗B|2, (4)
and the instantaneous received signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of eavesdropper’s channel
is given by
γ
(†)
E =
PA
σ2E
|hα∗E|2
PJ
σ2E
∥∥ℵ⊥hJE∥∥2F + 1 , (5)
where hα∗B and hα∗E denote the CSIs of the selected legitimate channel and the selected transmit antenna
to the eavesdropper channel, respectively. Its entries follow Rayleigh distribution with zero mean,
and variance λAB and λAE. σ
2
B and σ
2
E denote the noise variance at the legitimate user and eavesdropper,
respectively. PA and PJ denote the transmit powers at the BS and the jammer, respectively.
2.2.2. Null-Space Artificial Noise
To relax the assumption in the ZFB scheme, we now consider that the CSI of J → E link is
unavailable at the relay and the relay only has the knowledge of CSI for J → B link. Here, the
NAN scheme is exploited to emit artificial noise in the nullspace of the selected legitimate user but
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disperse in all directions towards the eavesdropper. We design the AJ × AJ beamforming matrix as
W =
[
wJB, WJE
]
, where wJB is an AJ × 1 vector used for J → B link and WJE is an AJ ×
(
AJ − 1
)
matrix
used to deteriorate the quality of eavesdropper’s channel by transmitting AN in all directions except
towards the selected legitimate user.
To do so, we choose wJB as the principle eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of
hJBh
†
JB, and then choose WJE as the remaining AJ − 1 eigenvectors of hJBh†JB such that WJE lies in the
nullspace of hJB, i.e., hJBWJE = 0. As such, W is a unitary matrix. In addition, since the cooperative
jammer has no knowledge about hJE, the jammer distributes the transmit power PJ uniformly across
the AJ − 1 transmit antennas. Building on this, we have the same instantaneous SNR of the legitimate
channel as the ZFB scheme, and the corresponding instantaneous SINR of the eavesdropper’s channel
is given by
γ
(‡)
E =
PA
σ2E
|hα∗E|2
1
AJ−1
PJ
σ2E
∥∥hJEWJE∥∥2F + 1 . (6)
For both cooperative jamming schemes, we further assume that the total transmit power adopted
at the BS and CJ is constrained by PS, i.e., PA + PJ = PS. We define φ, 0 < φ < 1, as the power allocation
scaling factor which denotes the fraction of the power allocation to the BS, such that PA = φPS and
PJ = (1 − φ) PS. For notational convenience, we define the overall average transmit SNR as γS=PS/σ2B,
the average transmit SNR of A → B link, A → E link and J → E link as γB = PA/σ2B, γE = PA/σ2E and
γJ = PJ/σ
2
E, respectively.
We also denote MBE = γB/γE as the ratio between the average SNR of A → B link and A → E
link, i.e., the main-to-eavesdropper (MER) ratio. As such, we have γB=φγS, γE = γB/MBE and
γJ = (1 − φ) γS/MBE.
We highlight that the proposed methods bring about several advantages that are of particular
interest to WSNs. First, the exploitation of SSC scheduling among legitimate nodes help to avoid a
large amount of CSI feedback, which, in turn, reduces the share of air-link resources. Second, the best
antenna at the BS is optimal to the selected legitimate link but is equivalent to a random transmit
antenna for the eavesdropper. Thus, the eavesdropper cannot achieve any transmit diversity from
the best antenna. Third, the cooperative jamming schemes, i.e., the ZFB scheme and NAN scheme,
are designed to increase the interference at the eavesdropper while avoiding interrupting the selected
legitimate node, which provides a further safeguard for data transmission in WSNs. Building on these
advantages, we clarify that our proposed schemes allow low-cost sensor nodes to fully explore the
limited battery energy to support the core sensorial and computational operations, while guaranteeing
the secure data transmission from the sensor nodes.
2.3. Achievable Secrecy Rate
Now, the achievable secrecy rate of the SSC based WSNs with TAS and cooperative jamming is
provided by
Cs =
[CB − CE]+ = [log (1 + γB)− log (1 + γE) ]+ , (7)
where [u]+ = max (u, 0), CB = log (1 + γB) and CE = log (1 + γE) represent the instantaneous capacity
of the legitimate channel and eavesdropper’s channel, respectively.
3. Secrecy Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the secrecy outage probability and the effective secrecy throughput as
the main performance metrics to examine the secrecy performance of the considered network.
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3.1. Preliminaries
Before proceeding, we first determine the statistic properties of the end-to-end instantaneous
SNRs in the considered network. According to the basic principle of the SSC scheme and following the
same steps developed in [35], the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for γB,α is provided by
FγB,α (γ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Fγbα,k (γT)Fγbα,k (γ) , γ < γT,
Fγbα,k (γ) +Fγbα,k (γT)
[
Fγbα,k (γ)− 1
]
, γ ≥ γT.
(8)
Moreover, according to the antenna selection at the BS, we define γB as the resulting instantaneous
SNR of A → B link with γB = max
{
γB,α
}
, α ∈ {1, 2, ..., AA}. Considering that each legitimate channel
is subject to independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading, the CDF of γB is given by
FγB (γ) =
[
FγB,α (γ)
]AA
. Furthermore, with the assistance of binomial theorem [44] (Equation (1.111)),
the CDF of γB can be re-expressed as
FγB (γ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
[
Fγbα,k (γT)
]AA[
Fγbα,k (γ)
]AA
, γ < γT,
AA
∑
q=0
(AAq )
[
Fγbα,k (γT)
]q q
∑
q1=0
( qq1)(−1)
q1
[
Fγbα,k (γ)
]AA−q1
, γ ≥ γT,
(9)
where Fγbα,k (γ) = 1 −
γ
γB
exp
(
− γγB
)
denotes the CDF for end-to-end instantaneous SNR of each
legitimate link.
On the other hand, according to Equation (5), the probability density function (PDF) of end-to-end
instantaneous SNR γE with ZFB scheme can be expressed as
f (†)γE (x) =
1
γE
(
1 +
γJ
γE
x
)−(AJ−1)
exp
(
− x
γE
)[(
AJ − 1
)
γJ
(
1 +
γJ
γE
x
)−1
+ 1
]
. (10)
Similarly, based on Equation (6), the PDF of end-to-end instantaneous SNR γE with NAN scheme
is given by
f (‡)γE (x) =
1
γE
(
1 +
γJ
γE
1
AJ − 1 x
)−(AJ−1)
exp
(
− x
γE
)[
γJ
(
1 +
γJ
γE
1
AJ − 1 x
)−1
+ 1
]
. (11)
Proof. The detailed derivation of Equation (10) can be found in [30] (Appendix D), and following the
similar lines we have Equation (11).
3.2. Secrecy Outage Probability
The definition of secrecy outage probability is the probability that the achievable secrecy rate falls
down the predetermined secrecy rate Rs [30,38,41]. Mathematically, the secrecy outage probability can
be formulated as
Oout (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs) . (12)
Now, an exact closed-form expression for secrecy outage probability of the considered system is
derived and expressed in the following theorem.
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Theorem 1. The secrecy outage probability of the SSC based WSNs with TAS and cooperative jamming is
derived as
O(κ)out (Rs) =
{
O(κ)out−A (Rs) , ΠγT ≥ 0,
O(κ)out−B (Rs) , ΠγT < 0,
(13)
where κ ∈ {I, II} with I and II stand for the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme and the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme, respectively.
O(I)out (Rs) and O(II)out (Rs) are provided by Equation (19) and Equation (20), as shown at the top of the next page,
respectively. z = 2
Rs q2
γB
+ 1γE
, E1 = exp
(
− 2Rs−1γB
)
, and ΠγT = 2
−Rs (1 + γT)− 1. Γ (α, β) and Ψ (μ, υ; τ)
denote the upper incomplete Gamma function [44] (Equation (8.350.2)) and confluent hypergeometric function
of the second kind [44] (Equation (9.211.4)), respectively.
Proof of Theorem 1. Based on the definition in Equation (12), we have
Oout (Rs) = Pr (Cs < Rs|γB > γE)Pr (γB > γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P1
+Pr (γB < γE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P2
, (14)
where P1 and P2 are given by, respectively,
P1 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+y)−1
y
fγB (x) fγE (y) dxdy (15)
and
P2 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ y
0
fγB (x) fγE (y) dxdy. (16)
Now, inserting Equations (15) and (16) into Equation (14) for both schemes yields
Oout (Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ 2Rs (1+y)−1
0
fγB (x) fγE (y) dxdy =
∫ ∞
0
FγB
(
2Rs (1 + y)− 1
)
fγE (y) dy, (17)
where fγB (x) is the PDF of γB. Owing to the fact that the switching threshold γT is exploited in the
CDF of γB in Equation (8), we have the relationship between 2Rs (1 + y)− 1 and γT in Equation (17),
i.e., 2Rs (1 + y)− 1 ≥ γT or 2Rs (1 + y)− 1 < γT. For the simplicity of notation, we denote a boundary
point by ΠγT = 2
−Rs (1 + γT)− 1. To do so, the derivation of secrecy outage probability is separated
into two parts regarding the bound point ΠγT . Thus, we have,
Oout (Rs) =
⎧⎨
⎩
∫ ΠγT
0 FγB
(
λy
)
fγE (y) dy +
∫ ∞
ΠγT
FγB
(
λy
)
fγE (y) dy, ΠγT ≥ 0,∫ ∞
0 FγB
(
λy
)
fγE (y) dy, ΠγT < 0,
(18)
where λy = 2Rs (1 + y)− 1.
In the following, by substituting Equations (9) and (10) into Equation (18) and using [44]
(Equations (1.111), (3.381.3), and (9.211.4)), the secrecy outage probability Oout (Rs) in Equation (18)
is derived in Equation (19) for the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme. Similarly, for the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme,
Oout (Rs) is presented in Equation (20).
We remark that our new derived expressions in Equations (19) and (20) are ready to compute
because the involved functions are merely the easy-to-calculate exponential functions, power functions,
upper incomplete Gamma functions and confluent hypergeometric functions. As such, the optimal
performance and optimal parameters of the considered network are achieved with convenience.
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We further highlight that the derived theoretical results in Equations (19) and (20) are valid for
general WSNs with an arbitrary number of antennas at the BS and cooperative jammer, arbitrary
number of legitimate users, arbitrary average SNRs and switching threshold.
O(I)out−A (Rs) = [Fγ (γT)]AA
AA
∑
q=0
(
AA
q
)
(−1)q(E1)q
exp
(
γEz
γJ
)
γJ
(
γEz
γJ
)AJ−1{(
AJ−1
)
γJ
[
Γ
(
1−AJ, γEzγJ
)
−Γ
(
1 − AJ, γEzγJ
+ zΠγT
)]
+
(
γEz
γJ
)−1 [
Γ
(
2 − AJ, γEzγJ
)
− Γ
(
2 − AJ, γEzγJ
+ zΠγT
)]}
+
AA
∑
q=0
(
AA
q
)
[Fγ (γT)]
q
q
∑
q1=0
(
q
q1
)
(−1)q1
AA−q1
∑
q2=0
(
AA − q1
q2
)
(−1)q2 (E1)q2
exp
(
γEz
γJ
)
γJ
(
γEz
γJ
)AJ−1
×
[(
AJ − 1
)
γJΓ
(
1 − AJ, γEzγJ
+ zΠγT
)
+
(
γEz
γJ
)−1
Γ
(
2 − AJ, γEzγJ
+ zΠγT
)]
,
(19a)
O(I)out−B (Rs) =
AA
∑
q=0
(
AA
q
)
[Fγ (γT)]
q
q
∑
q1=0
(
q
q1
)
(−1)q1
AA−q1
∑
q2=0
(
AA − q1
q2
)
(−1)q2(E1)q2
×
[(
AJ − 1
)
Ψ
(
1, 2 − AJ; γEγJ
z
)
+
(
γJ
)−1Ψ
(
1, 3 − AJ; γEγJ
z
)]
,
(19b)
O(II)out−A (Rs) = [Fγ (γT)]AA
AA
∑
q=0
(
AA
q
)
(−1)q(E1)q
(
AJ − 1
)
γJ
exp
((
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
)((
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
)AJ−1
×
{
γJ
[
Γ
(
1 − AJ,
(
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
)
− Γ
(
1 − AJ,
(
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
+zΠγT
)]
+
((
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
)−1
×
[
Γ
(
2 − AJ,
(
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
)
− Γ
(
2 − AJ,
(
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
+ zΠγT
)]}
+
AA
∑
q=0
(
AA
q
)
[Fγ (γT)]
q
×
q
∑
q1=0
(
q
q1
)
(−1)q1
AA−q1
∑
q2=0
(
AA − q1
q2
)
(−1)q2 (E1)q2
(
AJ − 1
)
γJ
exp
((
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
)((
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
)AJ−1
×
[
γJΓ
(
1 − AJ,
(
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
+ zΠγT
)
+
((
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
)−1
Γ
(
2 − AJ,
(
AJ − 1
)
γEz
γJ
+ zΠγT
)]
,
(20a)
O(II)out−B (Rs) =
AA
∑
q=0
(
AA
q
)
[Fγ (γT)]
q
q
∑
q1=0
(
q
q1
)
(−1)q1
AA−q1
∑
q2=0
(
AA − q1
q2
)
(−1)q2(E1)q2
× (AJ − 1)
[
Ψ
(
1, 2 − AJ;
γEz
(
AJ − 1
)
γJ
)
+
(
γJ
)−1Ψ
(
1, 3 − AJ;
γEz
(
AJ − 1
)
γJ
)]
.
(20b)
3.3. Effective Secrecy Throughput
Before proceeding, we first present the definition of the secrecy transmission probability as the
probability that the messages are confidentially conveyed from the BS to the legitimate user without
leaking to the eavesdropper. Thus, according to [15] (Equation (8)), we have,
P (κ)sec (Rs) = 1 −O(κ)out (Rs) . (21)
From Equation (21), it is found that the effective secrecy throughput can be characterized as
the product of the secure transmission probability and secrecy rate Rs, which evaluates the average
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rate of the messages that are transmitted from the BS to the legitimate user confidentially in the
passive wiretapping scenario [14,15]. We now present the effective secrecy throughput in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. The effective secrecy throughput of the SSC based WSNs with TAS and cooperative jamming is
derived as
S (κ)T (Rs) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(
1 −O(κ)out−A (Rs)
)
Rs, ΠγT ≥ 0,(
1 −O(κ)out−B (Rs)
)
Rs, ΠγT < 0,
(22)
where κ ∈ {I, II} with I and II represent the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme and the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme, respectively.
Proof of Theorem 2. By substituting Equations (19) and (20) into Equation (22), the exact closed-form
expressions for the effective secrecy throughput of the considered WSNs can be obtained.
4. Simulations and Discussions
In this section, we perform the simulations with MATLAB R2014a 64-bit version (The MathWorks,
Inc., Natick, MA, USA) running on a Windows 7 64-bit system (Microsoft, Redmond, Washington D.C.,
USA). Monte Carlo simulation results of the proposed TAS-SSC-ZFB and TAS-SSC-NAN schemes
are presented to validate the conducted analysis and illustrate the joint impact of the key system
parameters on the secrecy performance of the considered network.
Figure 2 illustrates the secrecy outage probability versus overall average transmit SNR γS of
the considered system with equal power allocation for both schemes. It can be readily observed
that the theoretical analyses in Theorem 1 are in exact agreement with the Monte Carlo simulations,
which demonstrates the correctness of our derived results. Moreover, we observe that the TAS-SSC-ZFB
scheme outperforms the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme, which can be explained by the fact that the
TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme benefits from the CSIs of both J → B channel and J → E channel while
the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme merely relies on the knowledge of the J → B channel. In addition, as
expected, increasing the number of transmit antennas brings about a significant secrecy performance
improvement while enhancing the secrecy rate results in larger secrecy outage probability.
Figure 3 examines the secrecy outage probability versus different antenna configurations at
the cooperative jammer. Interestingly, we first see that the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme degrades into
the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme when the number of antennas at the jammer is equal to two. Such an
observation is explained by the fact that the PDF of γE for the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme is equivalent
to that for the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme when AJ = 2. Next, we find that the secrecy performance
comes to a floor for both schemes when the number of antennas grows large. Notably, the secrecy
outage floors can be further improved by increasing the number of antennas at the BS or decreasing
the predetermined secrecy rate. Finally, we find that the secrecy performance is independent of the
number of legitimate users in the networks. This is demonstrated by the observation that Oout (Rs)
stays the same when NB = 2 increases to NB = 4 with AA = 2, Rs = 1 setup for both schemes.
Figure 4 depicts the secrecy outage probability versus different switching threshold γT for the
given equal power allocation. Firstly, we find that there exists an optimal switching threshold γ∗T for
both schemes, which accounts for the SSC scheduling being employed in the networks and being
independent of the way that the cooperative jammer operates. Regarding the antenna configuration
of the cooperative jammer, it can be observed that increasing the number of antennas has a positive
impact on the secrecy performance and the minimum Oout (Rs) shifts to the left. In addition, we see
that the secrecy outage probability degrades when γE increases and the optimal γ
∗
T shifts to right. For
instance, γ∗T increases from 10.9 dB for MBE=10 to 11.7 dB for MBE=5 concerning the TAS-SSC-ZFB
scheme when AJ = 3, and increases from 11.6 dB for MBE=10 to 12.45 dB for MBE=5 concerning the
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TAS-SSC-NAN scheme when AJ = 3. This reveals that a larger switching threshold setup is required
to obtain the minimum Oout (Rs) for larger γE.
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Figure 2. Secrecy outage probability versus different γS for AJ = 3, NB = 2, γT = 10 dB, MBE = 5,
and φ = 0.5.
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Figure 3. Secrecy outage probability versus different AJ for γT = 10 dB, MBE = 5, γS = 20 dBW, and
φ = 0.5.
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Figure 4. Secrecy outage probability versus different γT for AA = 2, NB = 2, Rs = 1, γS = 20 dB, and
φ = 0.5.
Figure 5 shows the secrecy outage probability versus different power allocation between the BS
and the cooperative jammer. Considering a given switching threshold, we can see that an optimal
power allocation factor φ∗ is found for both schemes. Specifically, the optimal factor φ∗ shifts to
the right when the number of antennas at the cooperative jammer increases (e.g., AJ = 2,MBE = 5
and AJ = 3,MBE = 5). This reveals that less power is allocated at the cooperative jammer since
this antenna configuration improves the capabilities of jamming. Once again, we can see that the
TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme and the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme yield the same secrecy performance when the
cooperative jammer is equipped with only two antennas. Furthermore, the optimal φ∗ shifts to the left
for both schemes when γE increases. This indicates that more power is necessary to be allocated for
the jamming signal to achieve the minimum Oout (Rs) in view of higher γE.
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Figure 5. Secrecy outage probability versus different φ for γT = 10 dB, AA = 3, NB = 2, Rs = 1, and
γS = 20 dB.
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Figure 6 plots the effective secrecy throughput versus different secrecy rates for a given switching
threshold and power allocation factor. In this figure, it is found that ST first increases and then
decreases as Rs increases, which demonstrates that there exists an optimal R∗s point to achieve the
largest effective secrecy throughput. To begin with, we concentrate on the impact of the number
of transmit antenna elements AA and the total transmit power γS. We readily observe that a larger
effective secrecy throughput is obtained while either AA or γS increases. Moreover, it can be seen
that the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme slightly outperforms the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme in the medium to high
regime of Rs. Furthermore, the optimal R∗s shifts to the right while considering that either AA or γS
improves. For instance, considering the cases AA = 2, γS = 20 dBW and AA = 2, γS = 25 dBW, we
see that increasing γS from 20 dBW to 25 dBW leads to enhancement of R
∗
s from 4.1 to 5.3 for the
TAS-SSC-NAN scheme as well as from 4.3 to 5.6 for the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme. Likewise, considering
the cases AA = 2, γS = 25 dBW and AA = 4, γS = 25 dBW, we find that increasing AA from 2
to 4 increases R∗s from 5.3 to 5.8 for the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme as well as from 5.6 to 6.2 for the
TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme. These observations indicate that the BS supports a larger secrecy rate for higher
AA and γS.
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TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme
TAS-SSC-NAN scheme
Figure 6. Effective secrecy throughput versus different Rs for AJ = 3, γT = 10 dB, NB = 2, γB/γE = 10,
and φ = 0.5.
We now focus on the impact of the number of antenna elements at the jammer AJ or the average
SNR of legitimate channel γE. As can be obviously revealed from Figure 7, decreasing AJ or increasing
γE results in a reduction in the effective secrecy throughput. Moreover, we find that R
∗
s shifts to the left
when AJ decreases or γE increases. Considering the cases AJ = 2,MBE = 10 and AJ = 3,MBE = 10,
it can be seen that reducing AJ from 3 to 2 decreases R∗s from 4.4 to 4.3 for the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme
and from 4.7 to 4.3 for the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme. Similarly, comparing the cases of AJ = 3,MBE = 10
and the case of AJ = 3,MBE = 25, it can be found that increasing γE from γB/25 to γB/10 decreases
R∗s from 4.6 to 4.4 for the TAS-SSC-NAN scheme and from 4.8 to 4.7 for the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme.
These observations indicate that the BS supports a lower secrecy rate for higher γE and smaller AJ.
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Figure 7. Effective secrecy throughput versus different Rs for AA = 3, γT = 10 dB, NB = 2,
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we designed the secure transmission in the SSC based WSNs with TAS and
cooperative jamming. Specifically, the TAS scheme was adopted at the BS, and the ZFB scheme as well
as the NAN scheme were, respectively, explored at the cooperative jammer to further improve the
security of the considered network. In doing so, we derived the novel exact closed-form expressions for
the secrecy outage probability and the effective secrecy throughput to evaluate the secrecy performance
achieved by both schemes. Additionally, numerical results were presented to validate the analysis of
the proposed schemes and provide insights into the impact of key system parameters on the secrecy
performance. Finally, it was revealed that the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme outperforms the TAS-SSC-NAN
scheme in terms of the secrecy outage probability and the effective secrecy throughput, while the
TAS-SSC-NAN scheme is more robust than the TAS-SSC-ZFB scheme.
Acknowledgments: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation of China (No. 61501507),
and the Jiangsu Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (No. BK20150719). The work of Nan Yang is
supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP150103905). The authors would like to extend
their gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable and constructive comments, which have largely
improved and clarified this paper.
Author Contributions: Maoqiang Yang, Bangning Zhang and Yuzhen Huang conceived of the main proposal of
TAS-SSC-ZFB and TAS-SSC-NAN schemes, conducted system modeling, and derived analysis and numerical
simulation of the proposed schemes. Maoqiang Yang and Daoxing Guo wrote the manuscript. Nan Yang,
Yuzhen Huang, and Bin Gao provided considerable comments and technique review of the proposed scheme
and contributed to the revision of the paper. Bangning Zhang and Daoxing Guo read and approved the final
manuscript.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Deng, Y.; Wang, L.; Elkashlan, M.; Nallanathan, A.; Mallik, R.K. Physical layer security in three-tier wireless
sensor networks: A stochastic geometry approach. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2016, 11, 1128–1138.
2. Gope, P.; Hwang, T. A realistic lightweight anonymous authentication protocol for securing real-time
application data access in wireless sensor networks. IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron. 2016, 63, 7124–7132.
3. Sun, L.; Ren, P.; Du, Q.; Wang, Y. Fountain-coding aided strategy for secure cooperative transmission in
industrial wireless sensor networks. IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform. 2016, 12, 291–300.
Sensors 2016, 16, 1908 15 of 16
4. Liau, Q.Y.; Leow, C.Y.; Ding, Z. Physical layer security using two-path successive relaying. Sensors 2016,
16, 846.
5. Mehmood, A.; Song, H.; Lloret, J. In Multi-agent based framework for secure and reliable communication
among open clouds, Network Protocols and Algorithms. Macrothink Inst. 2014, 6, 60–76.
6. Butun, I.; Erol-Kantarci, M.; Kantarci, B.; Song, H. Cloud-centric multi-level authentication as a service for
secure public safety device networks. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2016, 54, 47–53.
7. Trappe, W. The challenges facing physical layer security. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2015, 53, 16–20.
8. Xu, Q.; Ren, P.; Song, H.; Du, Q. Security enhancement for IoT communications exposed to eavesdroppers
with uncertain locations. IEEE Access 2016, 4, 2840–2853.
9. Curiac, D.I. Wireless sensor network security enhancement using directional antennas: State of the art and
research challenges. Sensors 2016, 16, 488.
10. Song, H.; Rawat, D.B.; Jeschke, S.; Brecher, C. Cyber-Physical Systems: Foundations, Principles and Applications,
1st ed.; Elsevier/Academic Press: Boston, MA, USA, 2016.
11. Sheng, G.; Wang, Y.; Lv, Z.; Song, H. Multiple-antenna systems and multiuser communications:
Fundamentals and an overview of software-based modeling techniques. Comput. Electr. Eng. 2016,
doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2016.08.015.
12. Xu, D.; Ren, P.; Sun, L.; Song, H. Precoder-and-receiver design scheme for multi-user coordinated multi-point
in LTE-A and fifth generation systems. IET Commun. 2016, 10, 292–299.
13. Yang, N.; Wang, L.; Geraci, G.; Elkashlan, M.; Yuan, J.; Renzo, M.D. Safeguarding 5G wireless communication
networks using physical layer security. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2015, 53, 20–27.
14. Yang, N.; Yan, S.; Yuan, J.; Malaney, R.; Subramanian, R.; Land, I. Artificial noise: Transmission optimization
in multi-input single-output wiretap channels. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2015, 63, 1771–1783.
15. Yang, N.; Elkashlan, M.; Duong, T.Q.; Yuan, J.; Malaney, R. Optimal transmission with artificial noise in
MISOME wiretap channels. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2016, 65, 2170–2181.
16. Yang, N.; Yeoh, P.L.; Elkashlan, M.; Schober, R.; Collings, I.B. Transmit antenna selection for security
enhancement in MIMO wiretap channels. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2013, 61, 144–154.
17. Yan, S.; Yang, N.; Malaney, R.; Yuan, J. Transmit antenna selection with Alamouti coding and power allocation
in MIMO wiretap channels. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun. 2014, 13, 1656–1667.
18. Huang, Y.; Al-Qahtani, F.; Duong, T.; Wang, J.; Xiao, C. Secure transmission in spectrum sharing MIMO
channels with generalized antenna selection over Nakagami-m channels. IEEE Access 2016, 4, 4058–4065.
19. Zhu, J.; Zou, Y.; Wang, G.; Yao, Y.D.; Karagiannidis, G.K. On secrecy performance of antenna-selection-aided
MIMO systems against eavesdropping. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2016, 65, 214–225.
20. Yeoh, P.L.; Elkashlan, M.; Kim, K.J.; Duong, T.Q.; Karagiannidis, G.K. Transmit antenna selection in cognitive
MIMO relaying with multiple primary transceivers. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2016, 65, 483–489.
21. Pan, G.; Lei, H.; Deng, Y.; Fan, L.; Yang, J.; Chen, Y.; Ding, Z. On secrecy performance of MISO SWIPT
systems with TAS and imperfect CSI. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016, 64, 3831–3843.
22. Park, K.H.; Wang, T.; Alouini, M.S. On the jamming power allocation for secure amplify-and-forward
relaying via cooperative jamming. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2013, 31, 1741–1750.
23. Xiong, J.; Cheng, L.; Ma, D.; Wei, J. Destination aided cooperative jamming for dual-hop amplify-and-forward
MIMO untrusted relay systems. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2016, 65, 7274–7284.
24. Chen, X.; Chen, J.; Zhang, H.; Zhang, Y.; Yuen, C. On secrecy performance of a multi-antenna jammer aided
secure communications with imperfect CSI. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2016, 65, 8014–8024.
25. Hao, D.; Hui-Ming, W.; Wei, G.; Wenjie, W. Secrecy transmission with a helper: To relay or to jam. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Forensics Secur. 2015, 10, 293–307.
26. Zheng, C.; Cumanan, K.; Ding, Z.; Johnston, M.; Le Goff, S.Y. Secrecy rate optimizations for a MIMO secrecy
channel with a cooperative jammer. IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2015, 64, 1833–1847.
27. Zhao, R.; Huang, Y.; Wang, W.; Lau, V.K.N. Ergodic achievable secrecy rate of multiple-antenna relay systems
with cooperative jamming. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun. 2016, 15, 2537–2551.
28. Li, Z.; Jing, T.; Ma, L.; Huo, Y.; Qian, J. Worst-case cooperative jamming for secure communications in CIOT
networks. Sensors 2016, 16, 339.
29. Zhang, T.; Huang, Y.; Cai, Y.; Yang, W. Secure transmission in spectrum sharing relaying networks with
multiple antennas. IEEE Commun. Lett. 2016, 20, 824–827.
Sensors 2016, 16, 1908 16 of 16
30. Huang, Y.; Wang, J.; Zhong, C.; Duong, T.Q.; Karagiannidis, G.K. Secure transmission in cooperative relaying
networks with multiple antennas. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun. 2016, 15, 6843–6856.
31. Shaqfeh, M.; Alnuweiri, H.; Alouini, M.S. Multiuser switched diversity scheduling schemes.
IEEE Trans. Commun. 2012, 60, 2499–2510.
32. Holter, B.; Alouini, M.S.; Oien, G.E.; Hong-Chuan, Y. Multiuser switched diversity transmission.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, Los Angeles, CA, USA, 26–29 September 2004;
pp. 2038–2043.
33. Yang, M.; Guo, D.; Huang, Y.; Duong, T.Q.; Zhang, B. Physical layer security with threshold-based
multiuser scheduling in multi-antenna wireless networks. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016, doi:10.1109/
TCOMM.2016.2606396.
34. Yang, M.; Guo, D.; Huang, Y.; Duong, T.Q.; Zhang, B. Secure multiuser scheduling in downlink dual-hop
regenerative relay networks over Nakagami-m fading channels. IEEE Trans. Wirel. Commun. 2016,
doi:10.1109/TWC.2016.2610965.
35. Hong-Chuan, Y.; Alouini, M.S. Performance analysis of multibranch switched diversity systems. IEEE Trans.
Commun. 2003, 51, 782–794.
36. Al-Qahtani, F.S.; Zhong, C.; Alnuweiri, H.M. Opportunistic relay selection for secrecy enhancement in
cooperative networks. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2015, 63, 1756–1770.
37. Fan, L.; Zhang, S.; Duong, T.Q.; Karagiannidis, G.K. Secure switch-and-stay combining (SSSC) for cognitive
relay networks. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016, 64, 70–82.
38. Bloch, M.; Barros, J.; Rodrigues, M.R.D.; McLaughlin, S.W. Wireless information-theoretic security. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory 2008, 54, 2515–2534.
39. Zou, Y.; Wang, X.; Shen, W. Optimal relay selection for physical-layer security in cooperative wireless
networks. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2013, 31, 2099–2111.
40. Wang, L.; Kim, K.J.; Duong, T.Q.; Elkashlan, M.; Poor, H.V. Security enhancement of cooperative single
carrier systems. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2015, 10, 90–103.
41. Hoang, T.M.; Duong, T.Q.; Suraweera, H.A.; Tellambura, C.; Poor, H.V. Cooperative beamforming and user
selection for improving the security of relay-aided systems. IEEE Trans. Commun. 2016, 63, 5039–5051.
42. Yang, M.; Zhang, B.; Huang, Y.; Guo, D.; Yi, X. Ergodic secrecy capacity for downlink multiuser networks
using switch-and-examine combining with post-selection scheduling scheme. IET Electron. Lett. 2016, 52,
720–722.
43. Ding, Z.; Leung, K.K.; Goeckel, D.L.; Towsley, D. On the application of cooperative transmission to secrecy
communications. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2012, 30, 359–368.
44. Gradshteyn, I.S.; Ryzhik, I.M. Table of Integrals, Series, and Products, 7th ed.; Elsevier/Academic Press:
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2007.
© 2016 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC-BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
